The SOTU

Joe gave a speech last night and I thought he got through it pretty well, cognitively speaking. The speech writer is no Shakespeare, but even there we need to give some leeway since these things tend to be hierarchical checklists of panderings, not composed enlighteners. They did what they were supposed to do to hit as many lefty voter categories as Joe’s handlers felt was necessary to shore up the base. All and all, I can’t think but that some of the party insiders came away thinking, “Well, OK then, we can work with that. He didn’t faceplant.”  Others in his party probably thought, “Nuts, he didn’t face plant.”  In any case, right now it looks like he and that other nitwit are the ticket. I think that’s good. Their having a hero ride in late on a white horse from Califa or someplace is more worrisome. An unknown could be a savior for the Dems if they could keep anyone from having the time to present any background research. It could be Bill Ayres and Angela Davis, and enough voters wouldn’t notice or care to notice until December.

Posted in Culture, Jurisprudence, Lawfare, The 2024 Elections, The War for America, Uncategorized | 1 Comment

The Ukrainian Navy

Insufficiencies of the Ukrainian ground forces have been easy to spot, although given their disadvantages, they’ve been doing work slowing the Russians down and making them pay a toll for territory gained. An aspect significant to our military in the news now is the Ukrainians’ successful use of anti-ship surface drones. The Ukes have been deploying them in swarms, along with aerial drones, at night. They’ve been sinking Russian ships. All of this is naturally a concern for every navy.  We need a large floating navy. Pretty hard to challenge pirates, launch aircraft, deliver supplies to overseas deployments, protect hospital ships, etc. etc. without a surface fleet. Ultimately, any felt duty to keep the world’s sea lanes open for unimpeded commerce can only be fulfilled by a robust surface fleet. And here come the drone swarms overcoming ship defenses. There will be technological answers, of course. What of the Russian response? Likely their analyses will include taking and thoroughly occupying the shorelines from which these things are being launched. The Russian Navy is absorbing big hits, and while that may seem like a big W right now, it can only fuel Russian desire to limit the sharing of the Black Sea among fewer parties. Also note that the drones depend on sat comms. The Russians might have opinions regarding ‘space law.’ NATO is now saying that it will defend Odessa. Huh? Slumping from defense of a fabricated democracy to defense of a secondary port? Sink the Russian Navy and get there by sea? March all the way down Highway E50? Oh, how about a surprise Franco-Prussian-Swedish blitz from Moldova across the Dnieper to turn and crush the Russian flank? Sweet. Gonna need a lot of CGI and social media.

Posted in Strategy, Uncategorized | 1 Comment

Colorado’s Progressive Lawfare

A good day for a political comment on things political. It’s Super Tuesday and it’s the day after the day before Super Tuesday. That is, the day after the Supreme Court of the United States published an emergency 9-0 ruling that crapped on Colorado’s supreme court for having tried to take a federal presidential candidate’s name off of the ballot in that state. Let’s focus for a second not on Donald Trump’s victory in the case and his being on the ballot in spite of what the MSNBC crowd had wishcasted. Let’s focus instead on how the heck the progressives crowd got a majority on the Colorado’s highest court. The monster has been very successful at lawfare in that state, and we need to come up with ways to reverse that. This SCOTUS ruling gives us a little bit of ammunition. The Colorado supremies need to be harshly ridiculed, contempt poured upon them for having played a frivolous gambit they had to have known was unconstitutional.

Posted in Culture, Jurisprudence, Lawfare, The 2024 Elections, The War for America | 2 Comments

German Generals?

Really? We get to hear what German generals are saying in secret? That’s interesting as all hack, if true. (see what I did there?) Doesn’t sound good for the Ukes, but hardly anything does these days. Beyond that is a big fog problem. Deep fake tech is progressing without my permission or input. Seems that it will soon make it tough to believe anything anybody says in the short range (near-term). Everything will require multi-source replication or confirmation, which will take time. It’ll be a nice era for high-resource deceivers. Not saying the leak of the generals is fake or a deception. No clue, really. As for the overall situation in Ukraine, however, I think real property in Kharkiv will be selling cheap. If I were a Russian gazillionaire, I think I’d be looking into buying property rights there, in other choice places east of the Dnieper, and even in Odessa. Anybody have a way of seeing if there is market activity along that vein? It would sure be a solid clue as to Russian elite confidence and intentions.

Posted in Strategy, Uncategorized | 1 Comment

Regarding the War for America Map

I listened to mapper/commenter Willy OAM this morning for the first time. Interesting and useful map-based discussion of the Ukraine war. He gave considerable credit to a mapper called suriyak-maps. Dima at the Military Summary Channel also sites Suriyak often. So, I went to the Suriyak site on YouTube. He has made a fascinating time-frame GIS of the war’s progress. I also went to Rybar. He keeps what he calls the ‘War Map,’ also called the ‘Rybar Map’. I mention these because of the mapping I would like to do for the war for America. Steep learning curve this year to be able to get things going by next January. As for the layers brainstorming, a fan suggested a layer on organized home squatting. Definitely, if I can find some efficient effective data sources for that. Anybody know a conservative community site where they share online GIS site production? BTW, I’m investing time in QGIS.

Posted in Conflict Geography, The War for America, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Moldova?

The Ukrainians seem to have shifted into a prevent defense. I don’t know about the Ukrainian or Russian situations enough to deserve to write a prediction, but I’ll do it anyway. I’m thinking that if the Russians take an average of about a half mile a day, in six months or so (that is, well before our elections), the Russians could be on the Kharkiv-Poltova-Kremenchuk-Kropyvnytskyi-Chisinau line, which looks on Google Maps to be more or less marked by Highway E584.

Today the Military Summary Channel noted that the Transdniestrians are in a fluster, about to ask for Russian aid in the face of Moldovan threats or something. All staged prob. In the past, I might have thought that was a mighty rare flavor of contrived dustup for my poor tastes, but right now it seems like it must mean something. I’ve been saying that the longer the Ukraine regime waited to negotiate, the greater the risk of losing Odessa and Ukraine becoming a landlocked, sub sovereign unentity of a state. I’m thinking this Transdniester thing is not good news for the Ukrainians in that regard. Seems the Ukrainians have been launching a lot of HMARS missiles at southern Kherson oblast recently and I wonder if it isn’t because they discovered some worrisome concentrations of Russian offensive forces there. Won’t matter anyhow if the Russian offensive to the north reaches the E584 line sooner than later.  The folks who need to worry are the Moldovans. What are they thinking, or are they? Anybody want to tell me the chances of us helping Moldova are greater than zero? Oh, and Catherine the Great. Her statue keeps getting taken down and put back up in Odessa.  Who wants to take bets with me that she’ll be going back up?

Posted in Geography, Strategy, Uncategorized | Leave a comment

Brainstorm America War Map Layers

The map will be built to tell where the war is. Below are some undeveloped ideas for layers. Any ideas?

Deportation events

Deportation facilities;

Deportation sanctuary zones (definition?);

Attacks on Christian Churches;

Attacks on food processing and distribution points;

Attacks on energy production nodes;

Attacks on other infrastructure;

Roadblocks;

Organized arson events;

Counties with over 70% Democrat voting experience;

Counties with under 35% Democrat voting experience;

Census layers;

Counties with over x/1000 population per square mile;

Counties w under x/1000 population per square mile;

Impunity chains (yeah, I have to figure out what I mean by this, but I think something like a place with a sheriff, DA, judges and political leaders all of the same party and funded by WEFsters.);

Police per 1000 under x;

Major bridges;

Main hydrocarbon pipelines;

Federal court buildings;

Public shooting ranges;

Percentage of school-age children in other than public schools over x%;

Number of hard-drug users attended by social services;

Attacks on Police Officers;

Land owned by foreign entities.

Posted in Conflict Geography, Geography, Strategy, The 2024 Elections, The War for America, Uncategorized, Worldview | 2 Comments

Aggregate Risk Distances in Ukraine

This is my first attempt to jam what I see going on along the Ukrainian-Russian front (at what some call the operational level) into my own strategy theorizin’. Section 141 in On Multiform War is titled ‘Aggregate Tactics’ and Section 142 is titled ‘Orchestration.’ Those two titles almost sum it up. In my earlier Winning Irregular War, Section 139 is called, ‘Strategy of Aggregate Tactics’ and the following section, 140, is titled ‘Risk Distance and the Pursuit’. I suppose that the aggregation of tactics could also be called the orchestration of tactics. No big deal, but the glue of what the Russians are doing to orchestrate tactics along the front is a constant measurement and re-measurement of local risk distances. It is advantage in the aggregate of local risk distances that matters. In other words, the Russians look in local detail to see how far they can go until it is too costly to proceed. Little culminating points tested over and over. The Russians are aware to plan tactical withdrawals at all times. The Ukrainians, conversely, have to determine how long they can stay in every bunker before they have to withdraw. All this at fifty spots along the whole stretch. Both sides have been made keenly appreciative of the coup d’ oeil. Both sides are buried in the need for efficiency in castrametation. It is just that the Russian armies have fielded more junior leaders who understand all this and far more healthy men for them to lead. It isn’t as though the two bears don’t know the wrestling moves. They’ve been to the same gym.  It is just that the Russians are in a much higher weight class and have been eating better lately. The Ukrainians have some advantage of interior lines. But that’s about it.  That advantage is being swamped by the Russian tactical aggregate. It is too hard for the Ukrainians to shift forces or commit reserves effectively given the numbers and distances of the little Russian breakthroughs. You know what probably doesn’t help you understand all this?  Clausewitz. Clausewitz? Fuhgeddaboudit. Meh. OK, I admit that the term ‘culminating point’ is from Clausewitz. There’s a 2009 article by Michael Toumey I ought to mention. “The culminating point: the lessons of Clauswitz [sic] and operation TORCH..” The Free Library. 2009 U.S. Military Traffic Management Command 26 Feb. 2024 https://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+culminating+point%3a+the+lessons+of+Clauswitz+and+operation+TORCH.-a0215842032   My explanation of it is the most thorough and bestest. On Multiform War. Get two copies so you can read it in stereo.

By the way, on a larger scale, theater let’s say, the Ukrainians reached their culminating point in their grand counteroffensive more than a year ago about when they got to the post office in Robotnye.

On a larger scale still, we exceeded the risk distance of our involvement sometime during the Obama administration.

Posted in Uncategorized | 5 Comments

American Ukraine Propaganda

A 16 February 2024 headline from the The Babylon Bee spoofs, “Congress Warns If We Don’t Keep Sending Billions To Ukraine, The War Might End.”  Funny, except not. Like so many Babylon Bee headlines, the truth is worse than the parody. An account from “X,” reminded by Citizen Free Press on 24 February, is of a New York traveler’s personal visit to friends in the Ukraine. @MariaMateiciuc tells us that the propaganda coming out the Zelensky government and canaried by ours, is all lies, that the Ukraine is ruined, hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian men are dead and Ukrainians want out of the war. Maybe she’s the propagandist, I don’t know, but we really should talk about our government’s war information strategy. We are not at war, and if mis- and dis- information is indeed a thing, a bad thing, our government appears to be a main culprit. I’ve been following The Military Summary Channel for a long time now. I don’t think the site is propaganda. I think that mapper, albeit tilting pro -Russian, is doing a sincere, comprehensive job recording the war from open sources – many of them. Following the war on the Military Summary Channel, I get the impression that most of the journalists and pundits (including too many retired US generals) who publish or opine about the Ukraine war — in those articles that show up front-page on my internet browser — are whoring themselves. We need to resist the notion that our diplomatic and military establishment somehow has the right as a matter of sovereign imperative to bombard us with BS in the name of smart strategy. Doing the right thing we are not.

Posted in Culture | 3 Comments

and Beyond (The War for our Fulminate after Hamas and Ukraine)

Important that we keep track of what is going on with both the Hamas and the Ukraine wars. The war at home is getting started, however. It’ll be much different than either of those other two, but that doesn’t mean there aren’t a lot of factors and lessons to be learned. There are also principles that apply to all three — principles that some actors will ignore to their detriment and others remember to their benefit. Right now, I’m trying to figure out the right structure, the right mechanism, the right method for following the war as it unfolds (and if it actually is). I don’t have to have the platform ready immediately.  My goal is to have it set up on this site by the end of the year.  I’m trying to work up the gumption and confidence to make an interactive GIS, even if just a simple one that follows four or five basic items. I think I would like to follow what is going on county by county. I’ll try to track some proxy or reflective conditions or events to show where the war is (or isn’t – the hypothesis will be that the war is raging; I’ll stay open to falsifying the hypothesis).  Right now, I’m thinking that the population of illegally-entered immigrants will be one of the most significant factors in the outbreak of the war. This will have a different shape depending on the outcome of the elections. If the Democrats do poorly, there will be some level of official attempt at deportation. The deportation efforts will likely draw violent responses that have specific, easily mappable locations. If the Democrats do well in the elections, there will be both continued open immigration and public assistance and enfranchisement efforts.  These policies will draw opposition demonstrations at very least, and possibly violence. Other guides might be roadblocks, attacks on infrastructure, etc. Ideas?

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