This is my first attempt to jam what I see going on along the Ukrainian-Russian front (at what some call the operational level) into my own strategy theorizin’. Section 141 in On Multiform War is titled ‘Aggregate Tactics’ and Section 142 is titled ‘Orchestration.’ Those two titles almost sum it up. In my earlier Winning Irregular War, Section 139 is called, ‘Strategy of Aggregate Tactics’ and the following section, 140, is titled ‘Risk Distance and the Pursuit’. I suppose that the aggregation of tactics could also be called the orchestration of tactics. No big deal, but the glue of what the Russians are doing to orchestrate tactics along the front is a constant measurement and re-measurement of local risk distances. It is advantage in the aggregate of local risk distances that matters. In other words, the Russians look in local detail to see how far they can go until it is too costly to proceed. Little culminating points tested over and over. The Russians are aware to plan tactical withdrawals at all times. The Ukrainians, conversely, have to determine how long they can stay in every bunker before they have to withdraw. All this at fifty spots along the whole stretch. Both sides have been made keenly appreciative of the coup d’ oeil. Both sides are buried in the need for efficiency in castrametation. It is just that the Russian armies have fielded more junior leaders who understand all this and far more healthy men for them to lead. It isn’t as though the two bears don’t know the wrestling moves. They’ve been to the same gym. It is just that the Russians are in a much higher weight class and have been eating better lately. The Ukrainians have some advantage of interior lines. But that’s about it. That advantage is being swamped by the Russian tactical aggregate. It is too hard for the Ukrainians to shift forces or commit reserves effectively given the numbers and distances of the little Russian breakthroughs. You know what probably doesn’t help you understand all this? Clausewitz. Clausewitz? Fuhgeddaboudit. Meh. OK, I admit that the term ‘culminating point’ is from Clausewitz. There’s a 2009 article by Michael Toumey I ought to mention. “The culminating point: the lessons of Clauswitz [sic] and operation TORCH..” The Free Library. 2009 U.S. Military Traffic Management Command 26 Feb. 2024 https://www.thefreelibrary.com/The+culminating+point%3a+the+lessons+of+Clauswitz+and+operation+TORCH.-a0215842032 My explanation of it is the most thorough and bestest. On Multiform War. Get two copies so you can read it in stereo.
By the way, on a larger scale, theater let’s say, the Ukrainians reached their culminating point in their grand counteroffensive more than a year ago about when they got to the post office in Robotnye.
On a larger scale still, we exceeded the risk distance of our involvement sometime during the Obama administration.
First off, 1985 me could easily have seen me laboring in 2024 in an off-world sugar mine as an employee of a company called RoboTyne.
The Ukrainian effort I think was really stretched along way too large a front; I don’t know what their options really could have been, and I’m not a combat arms guy, so anything I say past this point you can put an asterisk upon….
Politically, both domestically and internationally, Zelenskyy was tied to a likely infeasible “not one inch” strategy, and frankly, it paid off for the period where the Ukrainians were aggressively regaining lost territory. And, the Uks can likely garrison reclaimed territory with far less in the way of forces than the Russians can occupy.
There also seems to be a tremendous quotient of hope that battlefield reversals could result domestic regime change in Moscow.
As far as the failure to understand this in Kiev or DC, first, as far as Obama, he had no real care over Ukraine except as it would jeopardize Russian participation in JCPOA with Iran (which was vital.) Biden is seen internationally as the third Obama Administration, in no small part from its own public pronouncements.
Its been widely reported that the last offensive was not militarily popular within Zelenskyy’s military advisors, and that Zelenskyy pushed it (and the defense of Bakhmut) for political reasons against sound military ones. I’d say the failure of the last conscription legislation was the political culmination point.
Ultimately what we are seeing is the outcome of lucky amateurs culminating, against the cold assessments of the art of the possible from more grizzled professionals (and the professionally adjacent.)
The Western leaning Ukrainians could take a country in a coup de etat, perhaps a popular one. Holding it was a different matter, especially when their military power was basically zero. That said, perhaps our point was failing to see that, and not coming up with an effective means to sustainable build whatever “army” Ukraine could field and fight.
Oh, and there is also just good old fashioned groupthink and wish fulfillment in Ukraine as well.
I think most of us would want the Ukrainians and collective west to defeat Russia in this war, and certainly wish for a cessation of hostilities on terms generally favorable to Ukraine. For my part, its part of a basket of wishes, to include a working southern border, a reduction in distracted driving, larger intact nuclear families and a thousand other things.
But I think many of the commentators on this fail to understand a single point. We could give Ukraine another 100 or 1000 billion dollars, and if there nothing or a decreasing force comparative to the adversary force to multiple (always understanding the subtracting factors to the sum of effort like corruption and incompetence) its not going to have a meaningful effect on the battlefield.
But I think the collective Western counter-Russian think tank establishment (historically in my experience with the problem set, the American defense hawkish Left and the Euro defense hawkish right) is committed to victory, hoping to wish it to fruition, and all lacking lots of concrete data and understanding what it would needed, if it was ever really possible.
I would imagine that bilateral or EU ground combat aid is being mooted in policy circles, first of course as in country “advisors” or “trainers” and advancing from there. I’m at a bit of a loss to see what capacity or capability that could be pushed via a non-NATO or US angle (as I think that is, for now, clearly seen as a mammoth escalation it would be.)
Perhaps something like a naval blockade by the EU, but honestly, I think there is nothing to be gained (the grain export deal is kind of working, and any non Black Sea kinetic activity would risk it, and the Ukrainians need ports more than the Russians.
I didn’t really start following the war on a daily basis until after the front had quagmired. I suspect, however, that we (we who got the bulk of our info from our vaunted press) were misled into thinking the Ukrainians masterfully and bravely swept the Russian Army out, retaking most of the territory taken by evil invaders. I don’t think the Russians had actually taken that much territory. I bet we will find out that they were mostly stuck along lines of approach and communication, occupying roads and not space. I, along with most, thought the Russians would sew up their take-over and I was surprised at how badly the Russians had underestimated both the resistance and the weather. But that is all ancient history. Now it is revenge of the basics. Russia is huge, populous, right next door, and the leader of Russian strategy has resolved to take the place. Da. It was easy to fall for all the Ukraine democracy stand up to a dictator underdog stuff, but stuff is all it was. Our deep state was deeply invested in Ukraine, as was the Democrat money machine. It was not national interest. It still isn’t. The Zelensky regime is as worth saving as the Democratic Party, or the Turkish government. An old saw in statescraft: ‘Ally with strength, not weakness.’ Ukraine. Well, maybe it’s easy to see how the crew that contrived the coup didn’t want its work going to poo. But it has. We best not chase the sunken costs.
First off, 1985 me could easily have seen me laboring in 2024 in an off-world sugar mine as an employee of a company called RoboTyne.
The Ukrainian effort I think was really stretched along way too large a front; I don’t know what their options really could have been, and I’m not a combat arms guy, so anything I say past this point you can put an asterisk upon….
Politically, both domestically and internationally, Zelenskyy was tied to a likely infeasible “not one inch” strategy, and frankly, it paid off for the period where the Ukrainians were aggressively regaining lost territory. And, the Uks can likely garrison reclaimed territory with far less in the way of forces than the Russians can occupy.
There also seems to be a tremendous quotient of hope that battlefield reversals could result domestic regime change in Moscow.
As far as the failure to understand this in Kiev or DC, first, as far as Obama, he had no real care over Ukraine except as it would jeopardize Russian participation in JCPOA with Iran (which was vital.) Biden is seen internationally as the third Obama Administration, in no small part from its own public pronouncements.
Its been widely reported that the last offensive was not militarily popular within Zelenskyy’s military advisors, and that Zelenskyy pushed it (and the defense of Bakhmut) for political reasons against sound military ones. I’d say the failure of the last conscription legislation was the political culmination point.
Ultimately what we are seeing is the outcome of lucky amateurs culminating, against the cold assessments of the art of the possible from more grizzled professionals (and the professionally adjacent.)
The Western leaning Ukrainians could take a country in a coup de etat, perhaps a popular one. Holding it was a different matter, especially when their military power was basically zero.
Hmmm. Your last paragraph. Wasn’t it Ben Franlinovich who said, when asked what the coup had created, “A Western puppet state, if you can keep it.” Yes, yes I think it was.